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Recent Social Security Reforms and its Impact on Old 
Age Pensions: A Simulation Analysis for Portugal 
 
Abstract 
In Portugal, the public old age pension system funding is based on the pay 
as you go method where workers’ contributions pay the pensions of current 
pensioners. Throughout the years, many changes have been done  in the Social 
Security system legislation, namely regarding retirement pensions. The most 
recent reform caused an increase in the normal retirement age and added some 
factors to the calculation of the retirement benefit. 
In this report we analyze the impact of those reforms on the old age pension 
benefit under the Social Security system and on the present value of private 
pension funds responsibilities. Therefore, we consider the main features of both 
the public old age pension system and the complementary private pension 
plans, offered by banks to their employees. 
 
 
 
Keywords: normal retirement age; retirement pension; Social Security system; 
complementary pension plans; DL no. 187/2007; DL no. 167-E/2013 
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Reformas Recentes na Segurança Social e o Seu Impacto 
nas Pensões de Velhice: Uma Simulação para Portugal 
 
Resumo 
Em Portugal, o financiamento do sistema público de pensões de velhice é 
baseado no método de repartição em que as contribuições dos trabalhadores 
pagam as pensões dos atuais reformados. Ao longo dos anos, muitas alterações 
foram efetuadas na legislação do sistema da Segurança Social, nomeadamente 
no que se refere às pensões de reforma. Assim sendo, as reformas mais recentes 
levaram ao aumento da idade normal de reforma e adicionaram alguns fatores 
ao cálculo do benefício da pensão de reforma. 
Neste relatório, iremos analisar o impacto dessas reformas no valor das 
pensões de reforma no âmbito do sistema de Segurança Social e no valor atual 
das responsabilidades dos fundos de pensões privados. Assim, iremos 
considerar as principais características quer do sistema público de pensões quer 
dos planos de pensões privados complementares, oferecidos pelos bancos aos 
seus colaboradores. 
 
Palavras-chave: idade normal de reforma; pensão de reforma; Segurança Social; 
planos de pensões complementares; DL n.º 187/2007; DL n.º 167-E/2013   
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ACT: Collective Work Agreement (Acordo Colectivo de Trabalho). 
ALE: Average life expectancy at age 65. It is published annually by the INE. 
DL: Decree-Law. 
IAS: Social Support Index (Indexante dos Apoios Sociais). The IAS is defined by 
the Ordinance at vigor that year. At the moment it is equal to 419,22 euros as 
defined by the Ordinance no. 286-A/2014 at December 31. 
INE: Portuguese Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). 
NRA: Normal retirement age. 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
PAYG: Pay as you go. 
PBO: Present value of the benefits with past service or projected benefit 
obligation. 
SF: Sustainability factor. 
SS: Social Security. 
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Preface 
This work is the result of a three-month curricular internship done in the actuarial 
department of Ernst & Young (EY). During this period of time, I had the opportunity to 
work in non-life insurance and pension funds.  
In non-life, I analyzed the data of past claims and the projections of future claims mainly 
by Chain Ladder and Bootstrap methods.  
Since the company needed to study in further detail the theme of the SS pension system 
and complementary pension plans, the main focus of my work was on that subject. This 
report is the result of that study. 
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1. Introduction 
The SS system has been a very discussed theme in most of the countries across the 
world. This discussion is due to the current demographic and economic developments that 
may not be compatible with the PAYG method, which is the method used to finance most 
of the SS systems in the world (MacNicol, 2004; Population Reference Bureau, 2009)). 
Although opinions on the sustainability of the SS system seem to diverge a lot, most of the 
countries have taken measures to increase the NRA and to change the benefits formulas, in 
order to make the system more sustainable from the financial point of view1. Portugal has 
been no exception. 
In the last 8 years, there have been many changes in the Portuguese SS, although some 
of them are temporary. The most relevant are:  
 DL no. 187/2007 at May 10 – changed the SS pension benefit and added a SF; 
 DL no. 167-E/2013 at December 31 – changed the NRA, the SF and other factors. 
Therefore, it’s important to analyze the impact of the most recent reforms in the SS. 
These reforms impact not only the SS pension, but also complementary pension plans. If 
the SS legislation is constantly changing, complementary pension funds will have to deal 
with a high level of uncertainty, as the amount of their responsibilities may suffer a 
significant increase or decrease, depending on the legislation.  
This report will focus on the SS old age retirement pension and the complementary old 
age pension plans that are associated to it. In order to do so, we will analyze the most 
recent reform (DL no. 167-E/2013) and its impact on complementary pensions. As one of 
the most known sponsors of complementary pension plans in Portugal is the banking 
sector, we will study the impact DL no.167-E/2013 had in the banks responsibilities with 
old age pensions. All results presented in this document were computed in Excel using 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). 
                                                             
1
  European Parliament (2014) describes some of the recent reforms performed by EU Member 
States regarding pensions. 
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2. Complementary pension plans 
Pension plans can be qualified in many ways. If we focus on the relationship of the 
pension plans with the SS, we can divide them as: 
1. SS independent pension plans: pension plans where the computation of the 
benefits doesn’t depend on the benefit or any parameter of the SS pension; 
2. Complementary pension plans: pension plans where the benefit depends on the 
benefit or some parameter of the SS pension. 
2.1 Fully integrated with the SS: the total benefit of the employee (pension of the 
plan + SS pension) is defined. The pension fund pays the difference between the 
benefit the employee should receive and the benefit paid by the SS. 
2.2 Partially integrated with the SS: it is similar to the fully integrated with the 
only difference that it has an upper limit to the amount the pension plan pays. 
2.3 Suppletive pension plans: other pension plan that depend on the SS pension 
(i.e., 2 × SS pension). 
As referred previously, this report will focus on complementary pension plans, its 
advantages and disadvantages are summarized in the table below.  
  COMPLEMENTARY  PENSION PLANS 
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Table I: Some advantages and disadvantages of complementary pension plans 
Remark: The description of these kind of pension plans present in Bodie (1990) helped to construct this 
summary.  
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
T
o
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
y
er
 
Attract employees because it provides 
them an insurance against the changing 
of SS legislation; 
Transfers the SS risk from the employee 
to the company;  
Uncertainty relatively to the amount of 
contributions the company has to do; 
T
o
 t
h
e 
em
p
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y
ee
 
Ensure retirement income equity for all 
employees; 
The employer covers adverse changes in 
the SS retirement benefit;  
The employee knows what benefit he/she 
will receive when he/she retires; 
The employee can't add more 
contributions if he/she wants;  
The employee doesn't decide how the 
money is invested (market risk); 
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3. Portuguese Social Security system 
3.1. The current Social Security system 
The SS systems are very different from country to country2 not only in the computation 
of its pensions but also in its requirements and, most important, in its funding method. 
There are funded and unfunded SS systems (Plamondon et al., 2002). In Europe most of 
them are unfunded – their funding method consists in a PAYG basis where workers’ 
contributions are used to pay the pensions of today’s retirees. This kind of funding method 
may not be sustainable because countries, in general, have been confronted with an 
increasing old-age dependency ratio3. 
 
Chart 1:  Evolution in the world’s old age dependency ratio 
Source: World Bank, 2015.  
Portugal has a system that is neither completely funded nor completely unfunded. A 
part of the Portuguese SS is based on a PAYG system but the other is funded based 
through  the creation of the Financial SS Stabilization Fund (Fundo de Estabilização Financeira 
da Segurança Social), a pension reserve fund. Many countries have adopted this kind of 
measure due to the high transition costs associated with a change from a PAYG to a SS 
                                                             
2
 See OECD (2015) for a detailed explanation of the SS pensions system for the countries of G20 
(G20 includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, US and the EU countries). 
3
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system similar to Chile4 (Kritzer, 2002), completely funded. In Portugal, the majority of the 
benefits granted by the SS are still financed by the PAYG system; the Financial SS 
Stabilization Fund works as a small buffer that can only guarantee the benefits payment 
during approximately one year (13,78 months according to the last report issued by the 
Fund at 2014) 5.  
The current SS system in Portugal is based in the Social Security Basic Law approved by 
the Law no. 4/2007 at January 16.  
This report will only focus in the old age retirement pension since the others are not 
included in its scope6.  
3.2. Retirement pension requirements 
In Portugal, an individual who decides to retire before the NRA will usually get a 
reduction in his pension. On the other hand, if the individual retires after the NRA a bonus 
will be added to his pension. This kind of penalty/bonus system exists to motivate the 
active population to retire later. 
An individual who wishes to retire without any reduction in his SS pension needs to 
verify two requirements: his retirement age has to be equal or higher than the NRA and he 
must have 15 years or more of contributions for the SS, as defined by the article no. 19 of 
the DL no. 187/2007. However, there are four cases, referred below, that are exceptions to 
these two requirements7: 
 The flexibility of the retirement age; 
 The anticipation of the retirement age caused by the nature of the job; 
 Temporary measures for the specific protection of companies or activities by 
conjectural reasons; 
 In the case of long term involuntary unemployment; 
                                                             
4 In the Chilean model, the PAYG system was replaced by a system where workers contribute to 
individual retirement savings accounts. 
5
 Pursuant to article no. 1 of the Regulamento de Gestão do Fundo de Estabilização Financeira da 
Segurança Social, the goal of the Financial SS Stabilization Fund is to provide enough funds to 
cover the expectable expenses with pensions, during at least 2 years. 
6
 The SS system also provides other kinds of pensions, i.e., disability pensions. 
7
 For further details please see article no. 20, DL no 187/2007. 
PORTUGUESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
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We will only analyze the standard situation of retiring at an age equal or higher to the 
NRA since the majority of the Portuguese population does so - as can be seen in the OECD 
(2015). 
3.3. Retirement pension 
If a beneficiary decides to retire at the NRA – i.e. there is neither penalty nor bonus in 
the benefit received – the SS pension is computed as follows (please see Appendix A in 
order to get a better understanding of the SS old age pension computation): 
 If a beneficiary is admitted after January 1, 2002: 
 And the beneficiary has 20 or less years of contributions:  
𝑃8 = 𝑅𝐸 × 2% 𝑁, with 2% 𝑁 ≥ 30% 
 And the beneficiary has more than 20 years of contributions: 
In this case, the formula used to compute the pension will depend of the RE of the 
beneficiary. In Table II computation for each level of RE is presented. 
Table II: SS Pension for beneficiaries with more than 20 years of contributions 
RE Monthly Pension received (P) 
 
 
𝑃 = 𝑅𝐸 × 2,3% × 𝑁 
 
 
 
𝑃 = (1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁) + {(𝑅𝐸 − 1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆) × 2,25% × 𝑁}  
 
 
 
𝑃 = (1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁) + (0,9 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁) + {(𝑅𝐸 − 2 𝐼𝐴𝑆) × 2,2% × 𝑁}  
 
 
 
𝑃 = (1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁) + (0,9 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁) + (2 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,2% × 𝑁) +
{(𝑅𝐸 − 4 𝐼𝐴𝑆) × 2,1% × 𝑁}  
 
 
 
𝑃 = (1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁) + (0,9 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁) + (2 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,2% × 𝑁) +
(4 𝐼𝐴𝑆 × 2,1% × 𝑁) + {(𝑅𝐸 − 8 𝐼𝐴𝑆) × 2% × 𝑁}  
Source: DL no. 187/2007 at May 10 
 If a beneficiary is admitted until December 31, 2001: 
In the table below we have the summary of the SS pension computation for a beneficiary 
who is admitted in the SS until December 31, 2001. 
  
                                                             
8 P is the SS monthly pension of the beneficiaries admitted after January 1, 2002. 
[1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆; 2 𝐼𝐴𝑆[ 
[2 𝐼𝐴𝑆; 4 𝐼𝐴𝑆[ 
[4 𝐼𝐴𝑆; 8 𝐼𝐴𝑆[ 
[8 𝐼𝐴𝑆; +∞[ 
[0; 1,1 𝐼𝐴𝑆[ 
PORTUGUESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
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Table III: SS Pension computation  
If the beneficiary retires: 
until December 31, 2016: after January 1, 2017: 
  
𝑃∗ =
(𝑃1 × 𝐶1 + 𝑃2 × 𝐶2)
𝐶
  
  
𝑃∗ =
(𝑃1 × 𝐶3 + 𝑃2 × 𝐶4)
𝐶
 
 
  
𝐶 = 𝐶1 + 𝐶2; 𝐶 = 𝐶3 + 𝐶4; 
Exception: 
If the beneficiary has at least 46 years 
of contributions he will receive the 
maximum between this pension (𝑃∗) 
and the one computed previously (P). 
  
Source: DL no. 187/2007 at May 10 
𝑃2 is computed as 𝑃. 
𝑃1 = 2% 𝑛 ×
𝑅
14×𝑁15
, where 30% ≤ 2% 𝑛 ≤ 80%   
 
 
 
 
The SS pension is paid monthly and has 14 payments. At July and at December of each 
year the beneficiary receives the monthly pension plus an equal amount that corresponds 
to the Vacations and the Christmas subsidy. 
Exceptions: 
Notice that 𝑃1 has to verify 𝑷𝟏 ≤ 𝟏𝟐 × 𝑰𝑨𝑺 (unless 𝑃2 > 𝑃1).  
If 𝑃1 > 12 × 𝐼𝐴𝑆, 𝑃2 > 12 × 𝐼𝐴𝑆 and 𝑃1 > 𝑃2, then consider 𝑃1 = 𝑃2. 
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4. Recent reforms in the Social Security Pension 
As referred before, the evolution of demographic and economic factors has suggested 
that maybe the SS system needs some changes in its architecture. Having that in mind, the 
Government has been concerned in trying to revert this situation through changes in the 
legislation of the SS pensions. 
The most important reform is probably the one done by the DL no. 167-E/2013 at 
December 31 which changes the DL no. 187/2007 at May 10. At the DL no. 167-E/2013 we 
can identify three main modifications to the previous system: 
 The NRA increased; 
 The Sustainability Factor (SF) formula changed; 
 A bonus factor was added for the computation of the retirement age - for workers 
with more than 40 years of contributions. 
Each of these changes will be explained in further detail. 
 
4.1. Normal retirement age 
Until 2013, the NRA in Portugal had remained constant in 65 for a long time, at least 
since 1949 – as can be observed in OECD (2011). However, it did not remain unchanged in 
this reform. The NRA changed from the usual 65 to 66 in 2014 and in 2015 in order to 
adjust it to the change occurred in the SF. However, after 2015 the NRA will change every 
year, depending on the evolution of the average life expectancy at age 65 (ALE). In the 
article no. 20 of DL no. 187/2007 including already the changes made by the DL no. 167-
E/2013, the new normal age of retirement will be calculated as being the NRA at 2014 (66 
years) plus 𝑚 months where: 
𝑚𝑟9 = ∑ (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−2 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−3) × 12 ×
2
3
𝑟
𝑖=2015
      (𝟏) 
                                                             
9 Where 𝑟 is the year of retirement. 
RECENT REFORMS IN TH E SOCIAL SECURITY PE NSION 
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Notice that this expression can be simplified: 
 𝑚𝑟 = ∑ (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−2 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−3) × 12 ×
2
3
𝑟
𝑖=2015 = 8 × ∑ (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−2 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−3)
𝑟
𝑖=2015 = 
 
= 8 × [(𝐴𝐿𝐸2013 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸2012) + (𝐴𝐿𝐸2014 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸2013) + ⋯ + (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−3 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−4)  + (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−2 −
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−3)] = 8 × (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−2 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸2012) 
and 𝑚 = [𝑚𝑟], i.e. 𝑚 represents the rounded integer part of 𝑚𝑟. So we can say that: 
𝑁𝑅𝐴 = 66 years and [8 × (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−2 − 𝐴𝐿𝐸2012)] months        (𝟐) 
In order to better understand the impact this change will have in the evolution of the 
NRA, it is necessary to do a projection of the ALE. Appendix B shows the projection of 
ALE and NRA for three different10. These models represent an ALE with a constant annual 
growth, an ALE that depends linearly on the ALE verified on the previous year and a 
model where the ALE depends linearly on time. Looking at the chart presented below we 
can see that model 1 and 3 have similar estimates while model 2 gives us a projection with 
a slower growth of ALE.  
 
Chart 2: Projection of ALE by the 3 models from 2016 to 2100 
In Chapter 5 we will analyze the impact these projections will have on pensions, for 
each of the chosen models. 
                                                             
10
 In addition to these three models, we studied the use of a lognormal model and the use of a 
model who depends linearly of the ALE of the two previous years but rejected these options 
since the variables were not statistically significant. 
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4.2. Sustainability factor 
The SF is a ratio that reflects the evolution of the ALE; the higher is ALE in the future, 
the smaller will be SF, so, when it is applied to the pension calculation, the benefit will 
decrease. 
 This factor was introduced in Portugal for the first time in 2007 with the DL no. 
187/2007. Its main purpose is to reduce or increase the amount of the benefit at retirement 
in function of the ALE. This way, pensions can be adjusted according with the evolution of 
the ALE. 
The SF, before being changed by the DL no. 167-E/2013, was given by: 
𝑆𝐹 =
𝐴𝐿𝐸2006
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−111
        (𝟑) 
With the alteration of the legislation, instead of considering the ALE at year 2006, the SF 
considers the ALE at year 2000 which has a higher reduction effect than the one used 
before.  Therefore, the SF is: 
𝑆𝐹 =
𝐴𝐿𝐸2000
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑟−1
     (𝟒) 
In order to analyze the impact of this reform, we can compute (4)/(3) which will give us 
the ratio 
𝐴𝐿𝐸2000
𝐴𝐿𝐸2006
 that is equal to 92,7% and corresponds to a reduction of 7,3%. So, when we 
apply the new SF, independently of the behavior of the ALE we’ll get a reduction effect of 
7,3% relatively to the SF obtained with the previous legislation. To illustrate the evolution 
of the SF from one DL to another we can analyze Table IV. In this table the values of SF 
computed with the formula given by (3) and by (4) are presented, that correspond to the 
2nd and 3rd column of the table. We computed this factor since 200812 until 2026. We can 
observe in Table IV that SF suffered a huge decrease along the years (due to the increase of 
ALE) which also means a higher reduction of the pensions where it is applied.   
                                                             
11 Where 𝑟 is the year of retirement. 
12 The SF was first introduced in the DL no. 187/2007 but it was only applied to beneficiaries 
who retired after January 1, 2008. So 2008 was the first year where the SF was actually used. 
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Table IV: SF evolution from 2008-2026 
Retirement 
year (r) 
SF 
DL no. 187/2007 DL no. 167/2013 
2008 99,34% 92,08% 
2009 98,52% 91,32% 
2010 98,14% 90,97% 
2011 96,50% 89,46% 
2012 95,68% 88,69% 
2013 95,22% 88,27% 
2014 94,57% 87,66% 
2015 93,83% 86,98% 
2016 93,49% 86,66% 
2017 92,67% 85,90% 
2018 91,86% 85,15% 
2019 91,07% 84,42% 
2020 90,29% 83,69% 
2021 89,52% 82,98% 
2022 88,77% 82,29% 
2023 88,03% 81,60% 
2024 87,30% 80,92% 
2025 86,58% 80,26% 
2026 85,88% 79,61% 
 Remark: Please note that the values stated between year 2008 and 2016 are based on historical values, 
while the ones from 2017-2026 are  computed with the projections from Model 1. 
The SF presented in (4) is only applicable to people who retire after January 1, 2014; 
individuals who retired until December 31, 2013, had their pension computed with the 
previous SF. But the modification done to the formula of the SF was not the only change 
occurred. In the changes done in the DL no. 187/2007, this SF was created to reduce the 
pension’s value. This new DL decreased the SF having therefore a higher reducing impact 
but people who retire at the NRA won’t have any reduction in their pension caused by this 
factor. So this factor is only applicable to early retirements.  
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4.3. Bonus factor 
The changes mentioned before have the objective of making the SS system more 
sustainable from a financial point of view. There are many disagreements, mainly political 
to the use of this kind of measures since they create dissatisfaction in the active population. 
Modifications in pensions’ computation are usually seen as a sign of financial 
unsustainability, creating doubts on workers about the benefit they will actually receive at 
retirement. The 3rd change tries to reduce a little this demotivation from the workers. For 
the 1st time, a bonus factor is introduced to workers with more than 40 years of 
contributions 13 . Once a beneficiary makes 65 years and has more than 40 years of 
contributions his NRA is reduced by 4 months for each extra year above the 40 – being the 
minimum retirement age 65. 
The impact of these changes will be studied in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                             
13
 Where a year of contribution is as defined in the article no. 12 of the DL no. 187/2007 at May 
10. 
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5. Impact of the reforms 
There are many ways to measure the impact of a reform in the SS pensions’ 
computation. We will measure this effect in two ways: 
 Comparing the value of the pensions; 
 Comparing the present value of benefits (PVB). 
In order to do so, we need to choose a funding method to compute the PVB. In this 
report, we will always use the Projected Unit Credit method, since it is the funding 
method recommended by IAS1914 for pension funds. Thus, the actuarial liability for 
active members will be computed as the present value of benefits in respect of past 
service (PBO), as can be seen below: 
𝑷𝑩𝑶 = 𝑷𝑽𝑩 ×
𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆
       (𝟓) 
This method takes into account expected future salary increases (therefore being 
called a “Projected” method), it is an accrued benefit method (for more details see 
McGill et al. (2005) or Pugh (2006)).  
Notice that in this report we are only focusing in the impact for pensions of 
employees who retire at the NRA. 
 
5.1. Impact on SS pension – real population 
In this chapter, we will examine the impact of the change from the DL no. 187/2007 
to the DL no. 167-E/2013 by analyzing the effect it had on the value of the SS pension 
and on the present value of responsibilities with past service (for the Government). To 
compute these effects we will use the population presented in Table C. I (see 
Appendix C).  
                                                             
14
 IAS19 is one of the rules of the international accounting standards. The IAS19 prescribes the 
accounting and disclosure standards for employee benefits provided by companies. 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, many factors changed from DL no. 187/2007 to 
DL no. 167-E/2013 and therefore each of these factors has to be considered separately. 
At the end of our analysis we will also verify the effect they have as a whole.  
In order to see the impact of the reform we will compare the value of the SS pension 
computed with the previous legislation (that we will call Before) and the SS pensions 
that have the new changes included (that we will call After). 
All computations assume that there will be no more changes in the most recent 
legislation. In order to obtain the values presented in the tables below, we computed 
the SS pension with the two legislations referred previously. All the results and 
assumptions used to calculate the SS pension are presented in Appendix C and 
Appendix D. 
 
5.1.1. Impact of the change in the NRA 
Following the reasoning referred before we will first study the effect of the new 
NRA. In order to check the impact of the change in the computation of NRA 
exclusively, we have to assume that the values computed as After include only the 
change occurred in the NRA. Our assumptions are detailed in the table below. 
Assumptions 
Before: 
     
  
Pensions computed as defined in the DL no. 187/2007: 
 The NRA is 65 
 The SF is applied and computed as (3) 
 There is no bonus factor 
After: 
     
  
 The NRA is computed with the formula given in (2) defined in DL no. 167-E/2013 
 The SF is applied and computed as (3)  
 There is no bonus factor 
   
  
 
Nonetheless these assumptions are not enough because the change in the NRA 
brings up another question: the time value of money (i.e. receiving a pension of 900€ at 
2015 or at 2025 isn’t the same as there exists inflation and interest). So we have to add 
one extra assumption: there is an annual discount rate and we will use three different 
scenarios (an annual discount rate of 0,5%, 2,5% and 4%). 
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Due to the constant increase of the ALE the use of formula (2) to compute the NRA 
will cause an increase in its value. A rise in the NRA implies that people will retire 
later, hence the increase will cause two effects: 
1. Pensioners will have more years of contributions and possibly higher past 
salaries which means an increase in the value of the pensions they will 
receive; 
2. Pensioners will receive their pensions later, receiving consequently fewer 
payments and their pensions will suffer a reduction because of the interest 
rate effect. 
Thus, the value of the pensions will increase or decrease depending of which effect 
is higher. Analyzing the results for each of the discount rate scenarios (Table D. I, 
Table D.II and Table D.III in Appendix D), we can conclude that the change in the 
NRA will either have a positive or negative effect in the pensions depending of the 
discount rate. For Scenario 1 the effect referred in point 1 is higher than the effect 
referred in 2 so we have an increase on the value of the pensions. However, the higher 
is the discount rate, the higher is its effect. This effect is easy to verify in Scenario 2 and 
Scenario 3: contrasting with the increase on the value of the pensions verified in 
Scenario 1, in these scenarios we will have a decrease on pensions15. 
The use of an adequate discount rate is therefore very important – since it has direct 
impact on the conclusions taken. Looking at the discount rates used in 2015 by Banks 
for pension funds, we can see the rates were around 2,5%16. Therefore, in the next 
results we will use an annual discount rate of 2,5% as it is consistent with the current 
Portuguese market. 
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 The impact of the discount rate on pensions can be easily analyzed in Chart 4, Chart 5 and 
Chart 6 available in Appendix D. 
16
 This information can be found in the Relatórios e Contas of the companies e.g. in 2015 the 
annual discount rate was 2,5% for CGD, Santander Totta, Novo Banco, BPI and BCP. In 2013, 
some Banks used a discount rate of 4%.  
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5.1.2. Impact of the Sustainability Factor 
In this section we will study the impact of the SF alone and consequently we have to 
consider the following assumptions: 
Assumptions 
Before: 
     
  
Pensions computed as defined in the DL no. 187/2007: 
 The NRA is 65 
 The SF is applied and computed as (3) 
 There is no bonus factor 
After: 
     
  
 The NRA is 65  
 The SF is not applied     
  
 There is no bonus factor 
   
  
 
The pensions computed with these assumptions are presented in the Table D. IV 
(see Appendix D). As referred earlier in Chapter 4, with the new legislation the SF is 
no longer applied to the pensions of beneficiaries who retire at the NRA. As our scope 
only includes pensioners who retire at the NRA, we would expect this change to cause 
an increase in the pensions, ceteris paribus.  
Our expectations are fulfilled since  we verify and conclude (Table D. IV in 
Appendix D) that this change increased a lot the value of the pensions, independently 
of the model used. Calculating a sample mean, we can conclude that this new change 
increased the pensions by 12,7%, 9,7% and 13,4% for models 1,2 and 3, respectively. 
 
5.1.3. Impact of the additional bonus factor 
Regarding the bonus factor, its impact will not be analyzed separately since the 
bonus factor can only be applied if we also consider the change of the NRA.  
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5.1.4. The total impact of the reform 
The conclusions taken in the previous sections can be summarized as follows: 
1. The increase in the NRA has two effects: 
a. It increases the value of the pension as there are more years of contributions; 
b. It decreases the value of the pensions because of the interest rate effect. 
2. The non-applicability of the SF will increase the value of the pensions; 
3. The bonus factor, when applicable, should somehow reduce the effect given by 
the increase of the NRA. 
Analyzing the impact of the reform as a whole, as the discount rates are very low 
and the effect of not applying the SF is very high this reform should lead to an increase 
in the value of the pensions (i.e., the effect of 1a is higher than the effect of 1b). 
Nevertheless a decrease on the PBO should be expected as people will retire later (i.e., 
pensioners will receive fewer payments). 
To study the total impact of the new measures we will do the following: 
 For the column referred as Before we will calculate the SS pension as if the 
DL no. 187/2007 was still in force; 
 For the column referred as After we will calculate the SS pension with the 
new legislation in force (DL no. 167-E/2013); 
 We will consider an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
 
5.1.4.1. The impact in the value of the pensions 
Looking at the table presented below, we can conclude that this new measure 
increased the value of the pensions, as we were expecting. 
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Table V: Impact of the reform in the value of the SS pensions 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 850,49 982,28 15,5% 885,98 982,28 10,9% 845,19 982,28 16,2% 
2 1.018,56 1.128,13 10,8% 1.035,23 1.128,13 9,0% 1.011,43 1.128,13 11,5% 
3 991,74 1.123,87 13,3% 1.003,46 1.123,87 12,0% 984,74 1.123,87 14,1% 
4 506,21 584,65 15,5% 527,33 584,65 10,9% 503,05 584,65 16,2% 
5 456,42 501,19 9,8% 461,81 501,19 8,5% 453,20 501,19 10,6% 
6 451,43 508,55 12,7% 463,11 508,55 9,8% 448,32 508,55 13,4% 
7 467,26 535,24 14,5% 484,23 535,24 10,5% 464,10 535,24 15,3% 
8 526,91 602,83 14,4% 546,04 602,83 10,4% 523,35 602,83 15,2% 
9 917,08 1.047,65 14,2% 932,09 1.047,65 12,4% 910,67 1.047,65 15,0% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
 
5.1.4.2. The impact in the present value of the responsibilities with past services 
In order to examine the impact of the reforms in the PBO we will need to add the 
following assumptions: 
 Mortality Table: TV88/90; 
 Projected Unit Credit funding method. 
The results obtained in the table below show that the PBO increased instead of 
decreasing – with exception of beneficiary no. 3 and 9. These unexpected results are 
due to a very peculiar feature of our population: most of the employees started 
working at an early age (see Table C.I in Appendix C) thus when they get to age 65 
they have almost 50 years of contributions, which allows them to benefit a lot from the 
bonus factor. The effect of this feature can be summarized in the following way: with 
this new reform our population will retire at age 65 or close but with a higher 
pension17. So, we can conclude that in the case of PBO, we have to be careful with the 
conclusions taken because its value will decrease or increase depending on the 
characteristics of the population that is being used18.  
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 To get a better understanding about the differences on the results obtained for each of the DL, 
please analyze Table C.II and Table C.III present in Appendix C. 
18
 Notice also that the reduction or increase of the PBO depends a lot of the discount rate being 
used – low values of the discount rate may imply that its effect won’t be enough to compensate 
the increase on pensions. 
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Table VI: Impact of the reform in the PBO 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 78.576,14 90.752,37 15,5% 81.855,08 90.752,37 10,9% 78.086,22 90.752,37 16,2% 
2 133.560,99 147.929,59 10,8% 135.747,15 147.929,59 9,0% 132.626,53 147.929,59 11,5% 
3 131.634,15 121.718,95 -7,5% 133.189,15 121.718,95 -8,6% 130.705,28 121.718,95 -6,9% 
4 45.947,34 51.913,75 13,0% 47.864,70 53.067,39 10,9% 45.660,86 51.913,75 13,7% 
5 62.311,20 68.424,22 9,8% 63.047,28 68.424,22 8,5% 61.871,50 68.424,22 10,6% 
6 51.399,58 57.903,32 12,7% 52.730,23 57.903,32 9,8% 51.045,97 57.903,32 13,4% 
7 45.758,91 52.416,15 14,5% 47.420,36 52.416,15 10,5% 45.449,28 52.416,15 15,3% 
8 51.056,63 57.114,77 11,9% 52.910,43 57.114,77 7,9% 50.711,15 57.114,77 12,6% 
9 113.577,39 105.992,92 -6,7% 115.436,46 108.516,56 -6,0% 112.782,75 105.992,92 -6,0% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
With the purpose of understanding better the effect referred above, we will use our 
current population and change their date of entrance in the company to a later date (see 
Table C.V in Appendix C). The rest of the data will remain equal. In the table below, we 
have the same impact analysis used in Table VI but with the modified data. In Table VII 
we get the results we were expecting: the PBO decreased.  
Table VII: Impact of the reform in the PBO (with modified data) 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 73.500,86 71.696,90 -2,5% 76.568,02 70.375,44 -8,1% 73.042,59 71.696,90 -1,8% 
2 120.175,37 121.560,70 1,2% 122.142,43 121.560,70 -0,5% 119.334,56 123.637,13 3,6% 
3 131.637,72 121.722,35 -7,5% 133.192,76 121.722,35 -8,6% 130.708,83 121.722,35 -6,9% 
4 42.129,80 40.860,59 -3,0% 43.887,85 41.153,90 -6,2% 41.867,12 40.860,59 -2,4% 
5 59.599,71 56.983,07 -4,4% 60.303,76 56.983,07 -5,5% 59.179,15 56.983,07 -3,7% 
6 49.016,95 46.603,62 -4,9% 50.285,92 46.603,62 -7,3% 48.679,73 46.603,62 -4,3% 
7 41.661,64 40.703,95 -2,3% 43.174,32 41.744,72 -3,3% 41.379,73 40.703,95 -1,6% 
8 46.437,21 46.746,39 0,7% 48.123,28 45.942,56 -4,5% 46.122,99 45.606,23 -1,1% 
9 97.081,30 94.425,67 -2,7% 98.670,35 97.048,61 -1,6% 96.402,07 94.425,67 -2,1% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
 
Analyzing the age groups of the Portuguese population in recent years we can verify 
that few people start working before the age of 25. According to data published by INE, in 
2015 only 7,11% of the active population was between 15 and 24 - so only a small 
percentage of workers will benefit from the bonus factor. Therefore, having into account 
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the current active population, further analysis is needed since our data set is not an 
adequate sample of the Portuguese population.  
5.2. Impact on SS pension - standard population 
Having in account the characteristics of our population19, we can conclude that the 
results which apply to this particular set of beneficiaries don’t extend to the general 
population. Therefore we decided to evaluate the impact of the changes in a standard 
population. In order to perform that analysis we considered the following data: 
Table VIII – Average monthly net income in Portugal, by age group 
Age Monthly wage 
From 15 to 24 years old 533 
From 25 to 34 years old 725 
From 35 to 44 years old 868 
From 45 to 64 years old 906 
With 65 years old or older 715 
Source: INE, Inquérito ao Emprego 
Based on this data we created five different scenarios for beneficiaries who are 20, 30, 40, 
50 and 60 years old. With exception of one beneficiary who is 20 years old, we considered 
that this standard sample started working at an age between 24 and 2720. 
Table IX: Standard population based on INE's information 
Scenario Date of birth Entry date Current Age Age of entry 
Monthly Wage  
(euros) 
1 19/04/1995 02/06/2015 20 20 533 
2 
23/01/1985 17/08/2010 30 25 725 
06/07/1985 28/09/2011 30 26 725 
03/02/1985 16/07/2012 30 27 725 
3 
14/04/1975 17/12/2000 40 25 868 
30/06/1975 29/11/2001 40 26 868 
28/04/1975 28/12/2002 40 27 868 
4 
14/08/1965 04/06/1990 50 24 906 
19/02/1965 15/01/1991 50 25 906 
16/09/1965 16/06/1992 50 26 906 
5 
29/09/1955 11/06/1980 60 24 906 
27/03/1955 04/12/1981 60 26 906 
20/05/1955 04/10/1982 60 27 906 
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 The population analyzed has already an advanced age and has many years of contributions to 
the SS, these features do not represent the majority of the active population in Portugal . 
20
 Which represents 92,89% of the active population in Portugal, as referred in Chapter 5.1. 
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To this part of the report it is important to refer that for our previous population we had 
small differences between the results obtained for each model (Table V and Table VI), in 
this analysis we will see higher deviances in the results between the models. This is due to 
the advanced age of our population and because the projections of ALE for the first years, 
for each model, do not differ a lot. If we analyze Chart 2, it’s easy to conclude that although 
the three models start the projections with similar values, afterwards there is a big drift 
between model 2 and model 1 and 3. These differences will be reflected in our results21. 
Table X: Impact of the reform on the value of pensions for a standard population 
Scenario 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 557,19 809,01 45,2% 718,10 826,65 15,1% 555,90 809,01 45,5% 
2 
662,74 896,11 35,2% 803,06 908,96 13,2% 660,60 894,34 35,4% 
651,28 896,11 37,6% 789,17 908,73 15,2% 649,17 894,12 37,7% 
639,69 896,11 40,1% 775,12 908,96 17,3% 637,62 894,34 40,3% 
3 
691,84 892,38 29,0% 787,56 901,15 14,4% 688,88 892,38 29,5% 
689,32 889,14 29,0% 784,69 897,86 14,4% 686,37 889,14 29,5% 
677,03 889,14 31,3% 770,69 897,86 16,5% 674,13 889,14 31,9% 
4 
683,12 807,61 18,2% 731,95 813,22 11,1% 679,37 805,82 18,6% 
667,72 790,80 18,4% 715,46 796,48 11,3% 664,06 803,90 21,1% 
652,44 803,67 23,2% 699,09 809,24 15,8% 648,86 801,88 23,6% 
5 
638,08 699,95 9,7% 648,62 702,72 8,3% 633,68 698,40 10,2% 
608,18 686,07 12,8% 618,22 688,79 11,4% 603,98 684,72 13,4% 
606,71 681,55 12,3% 616,73 672,71 9,1% 602,52 688,03 14,2% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
Regarding the value of pensions, we can conclude that recent changes done by DL no. 
167-E/2013 resulted in higher pensions. Moreover, this increase is higher to people at 
younger ages (Table X). This behavior can be partially explained by the evolution of the 
NRA for each of these scenarios. Evaluating Table XI, we can conclude that younger 
beneficiaries will have to work more years in order to achieve the NRA. This will result in 
higher wages at the last years since we assume their salary will increase 2% every year.   
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 All results will be computed with the same assumptions used in the previous chapter, 
namely: 
 Discount rate of 2,5%; 
 Mortality Table TV88/90; 
 Projected Unit Credit funding method. 
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Table XI: Retirement age according to DL no. 167-E/2013 for a standard population 
Scenario 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Retirement 
date 
Retirement age Retirement 
date 
Retirement age Retirement 
date 
Retirement age 
Years Months Years Months Years Months 
1 19/03/2065 69 11 19/03/2061 65 11 19/03/2065 69 11 
2 
23/02/2055 70 1 23/03/2052 67 2 23/03/2055 70 2 
06/08/2055 70 1 06/09/2052 67 2 06/09/2055 70 2 
03/03/2055 70 1 03/04/2052 67 2 03/04/2055 70 2 
3 
14/04/2044 69 0 14/05/2042 67 1 14/04/2044 69 0 
30/06/2044 69 0 30/07/2042 67 1 30/06/2044 69 0 
28/04/2044 69 0 28/05/2042 67 1 28/04/2044 69 0 
4 
14/06/2033 67 10 14/06/2032 66 10 14/07/2033 67 11 
19/12/2032 67 10 19/12/2031 66 10 19/01/2033 67 11 
16/07/2033 67 10 16/07/2032 66 10 16/08/2033 67 11 
5 
29/05/2022 66 8 29/03/2022 66 6 29/06/2022 66 9 
27/11/2021 66 8 27/09/2021 66 6 27/12/2021 66 9 
20/01/2022 66 8 20/11/2021 66 6 20/02/2022 66 9 
In addition to this fact we also have to consider the impact of the SF on pensions 
computed by the DL no. 187/2007 (present in column Before). Through Table XI, it is 
possible to conclude that younger beneficiaries will have a lower SF when they retire at 65, 
which means receiving a lower pension when compared with the one received by older 
beneficiaries (e.g., in model 3 an individual who is now 20 years old will only receive 
66,62% of his pension while a beneficiary who is 50 years old will receive 82,03%).  
Table XII: Sustainability Factor for each scenario 
Scenario Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1 66,84% 86,54% 66,62% 
2 71,36% 86,96% 71,08% 
3 76,54% 87,64% 76,18% 
4 82,52% 88,90% 82,03% 
5 89,52% 91,39% 88,90% 
To sum up, with this new DL younger people will have higher increases on their 
pensions’ value due to two situations:  
1. They will retire later and therefore will have higher wages to be considered in the 
computation of their pension; 
2. Their pension computed with the previous DL has a high reduction due to the SF. 
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Table XIII: Impact of the reform in the PBO for a standard population 
Scenario 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 457,26 474,65 3,8% 589,31 639,75 8,6% 456,20 474,65 4,0% 
2 
7.490,64 7.075,48 -5,5% 9.076,60 8.873,91 -2,2% 7.466,42 7.017,68 -6,0% 
5.743,41 5.472,11 -4,7% 6.959,43 6.897,26 -0,9% 5.724,84 5.424,83 -5,2% 
4.861,51 4.726,11 -2,8% 5.890,81 5.948,63 1,0% 4.845,79 4.686,05 -3,3% 
3 
27.884,57 27.175,09 -2,5% 31.742,32 31.510,82 -0,7% 27.765,23 27.175,09 -2,1% 
26.237,26 25.481,55 -2,9% 29.867,11 29.595,05 -0,9% 26.124,97 25.481,55 -2,5% 
24.864,35 24.551,27 -1,3% 28.304,26 28.531,11 0,8% 24.757,93 24.551,27 -0,8% 
4 
58.436,70 56.782,71 -2,8% 62.614,20 61.382,68 -2,0% 58.115,92 56.327,28 -3,1% 
59.223,99 57.732,92 -2,5% 63.457,77 62.386,95 -1,7% 58.898,90 58.353,91 -0,9% 
53.683,64 54.141,51 0,9% 57.521,35 58.606,11 1,9% 53.388,95 53.696,81 0,6% 
5 
100.215,70 98.120,45 -2,1% 101.870,37 99.668,79 -2,2% 99.523,94 97.347,72 -2,2% 
99.530,21 100.189,06 0,7% 101.173,57 101.789,26 0,6% 98.843,19 99.397,36 0,6% 
97.558,22 97.649,30 0,1% 99.169,02 97.537,72 -1,6% 96.884,81 98.018,42 1,2% 
Total 566.187,44 559.572,21 -1,2% 598.236,12 593.368,04 -0,8% 562.797,10 557.952,62 -0,9% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
Regarding the impact on the present value of responsibilities, in Scenario 1 we can see 
the case of a beneficiary who is part of the small group of people who start working at an 
early age and who benefit from the bonus factor. This results in an increase of PBO for any 
of the three models. However this result does not extend to all scenarios. For people who 
start working after 24, in general the PBO has decreased, with the younger age groups 
being the ones to suffer a higher reduction.  
In conclusion, it is expected that this new reform causes an increase in the value of 
pensions and a decrease in the PBO for the population in general, with a higher impact on 
younger people. 
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5.3. Banking sector 
5.3.1. Complementary pension plan 
In general, banks are ruled by a unique and common ACT. The ACT is an agreement 
between one or more companies and the respective union that establishes the working 
conditions that will be applied to the workers. We will focus in the retirement pensions 
defined in this ACT as they are complementary pensions. 
The most recent change in the banking sector ACT was done in 2012. At the moment, 
the updated ACT is the one published in the Boletim do Trabalho e Emprego no. 8 at February 
29, 201222. 
With the recent changes done to the ACT banks have currently two types of plans:  
 For the employees admitted before January 1, 2008: a defined benefit plan; 
 For employees admitted after January 1, 2008: a defined contribution plan. 
Since the purpose of this work is to explore the complementary pension plans we will 
only focus on the defined benefit plan offered to employees admitted before January 1, 
2008 and who are covered by the SS23. The retirement pension benefit is computed as: 
𝐵 = (𝑥% × 𝐵𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝐵𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟) − 𝐵𝑆𝑆     (𝟔) 
𝐵 monthly benefit paid by the bank. 
𝑥% percentage in function of the total service time in the banking sector. It’s given in the 
Annex V of the ACT; 
𝐵𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 monthly benefit obtained in function of the level of salary of the employee. Its value 
is fixed in the Annex VI of the ACT;  
                                                             
22
 Boletim do Trabalho e Emprego is a document published weekly that contains information about 
the working regulations, statutes and other relevant information for the working environment. 
23
 The banking work force was only included in the SS system through the DL no. 1-A/2011 at 
January 3rd. In addition, notice that complementary pension plans  represent a small 
percentage of the defined benefit pension plans offered in Portugal (approximately 30,2%, 
according to statistics of ASF in 2015). Moreover, pension plans which are integrated with the 
SS as the one offered by the banking sector, represent only around 25,4% of the total number of 
defined benefit pension plans. 
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𝐵𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 monthly benefit obtained in function of the tenure bonus (diuturnidade) given to the 
employee at the year before retirement. It’s computed as explained in the clause no. 105 of 
the ACT; 
𝐵𝑆𝑆 monthly benefit paid by the SS. 
The NRA to acquire this pension is 65 years, which means banks have to support the 
cost of this pension all by themselves until the NRA defined for the SS. 
Pursuant to the classification presented in Chapter 2, this is a pension plan fully 
integrated with the SS.  
5.3.2. Impact of the reform on complementary pensions - example 
The impacts observed in the previous subchapter show that in general this new reform 
increased the value of pensions and decreased the PBO. In addition, since the SS pension is 
only received later, this implies banks will have to pay 100% of their employees’ pensions 
from 65 until the correspondent NRA. We will now analyze what is the impact of these 
measures on the banking sector responsibility for an hypothetical  population of 5 
individuals24. 
Table XIV: Impact of the reform in the PBO of banks 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 4.323,15 3.328,13 -23% 2.301,39 1.833,46 -20% 4.352,06 3.328,13 -24% 
2 10.173,25 6.707,97 -34% 6.508,27 4.620,59 -29% 10.222,36 6.808,65 -33% 
3 94.609,65 85.038,77 -10% 85.045,40 80.787,74 -5% 95.537,68 85.796,10 -10% 
4 71.010,75 63.200,77 -11% 65.106,36 60.435,18 -7% 71.417,75 63.606,70 -11% 
5 117.437,52 103.604,41 -12% 113.224,72 102.558,44 -9% 118.164,64 104.111,14 -12% 
Remark: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. Notice that the values in 
After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual discount rate of 2,5%. 
The values are presented in euros. 
Looking at the table above we can see that the change that occurred in the SS pension 
resulted on a decrease in banks’ responsibilities regarding this population. This is due to 
the high increase in the value of the SS pensions offered by the State. However, the increase 
of the NRA causes a big pressure for banks on the first years of retirement. In order to see 
                                                             
24
 These results are only applicable to the specific population used which has some particular 
characteristics in order to simplify the computations (e.g., many years of service in the banking 
sector). Since there is no data about the banking sector this impact can’t be extended to the 
banking population in general. 
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this effect let’s consider 𝐵(2007)𝑡  and 𝐵(2013)𝑡  the annual pension on year t which is 
responsibility of the bank according to DL no. 187/2007 and DL no. 167-E/2013, 
respectively. If we consider as negative cash flows   𝑡𝑝𝑥 × 𝐵(2007)𝑡 and as positive cash 
flows the ones given by  𝑡𝑝𝑥 × 𝐵(2013)𝑡, where   𝑡𝑝𝑥 represents the probability of a person 𝑥 
years old surviving until age 𝑥 + 𝑡, then we can compute the discounted payback period as 
being the minimum 𝑡 for which: 
∑   𝑡𝑝𝑥 × (1,25)
−𝑡 × (𝐵(2013)𝑡 − 𝐵(2007)𝑡)
𝑡≥0
> 0       (𝟕) 
The discounted payback period will provide us information on how many years does it 
take until the responsibilities of the bank with the new legislation decrease when compared 
with the previous one. 
Table XV: Discounted payback period for each model 
No. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1 20,00 18,00 20,00 
2 12,00 6,00 12,00 
3 20,00 26,00 20,00 
4 18,00 19,00 19,00 
5 9,00 7,00 9,00 
 
It is possible to see that, for this population, the impact of the change in the SS 
legislation is negative for a considerable amount of years (e.g., 26 years for beneficiary 3 in 
model 2). It is probable that this effect will be higher for younger beneficiaries because the 
NRA will be higher, i.e. the number of years for which the bank will have to pay the 
pension by itself will be larger. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this report, we analyzed the impacts of the change on the legislation regarding the SS 
old age pension to workers who retire at the NRA. Our study focused on two main 
impacts: the effect on pensions given by SS and the effect on complementary pensions 
offered by banks, according to the ACT.  
The results were obtained through the use of Excel and Visual Basic for Applications 
which are useful tools, easy to work on. Nevertheless, our data set was relatively small and 
a larger data set could have demanded the use of statistical software. 
First, we analyzed the effect of each of the changes done in DL no. 167-E/2013 
individually. Then, we studied the effect of the reform as a whole on the pensions value 
and on PBO. Results showed us that for a regular Portuguese worker, who starts to work at 
age 25 or later, the pensions increased in value but Government’s responsibilities with 
retirement pensions decreased.  
In general, this reform allowed a reduction on the Government’s responsibilities due to 
the effect of increasing the NRA. However, this rise of the NRA has negative effects which 
are not taken into account in the computations. Looking at Table B.I in Appendix B, 
according to Model 1, the NRA in Portugal at 2040 will be 68 years and 10 months, 
opposing to the 65 years at 2013. This evolution on the NRA is caused by higher average 
life expectancies. A higher average life expectancy means people will live longer, but living 
longer isn’t equivalent to being able to work longer. If a person lives in average until 100 
years old it is highly unlikely that the individual is healthy enough – both physically and 
mentally – to work until 70 or 80 years.  
I agree with the argument that SS systems in general, Portugal in particular, need to be 
restructured, but increasing the NRA isn’t the “magic solution” and governments have had 
a big disregard for workers by assuming they can work at such late ages. 
Regarding the particular case of complementary pensions offered by banks, the new 
legislation had impact on its computation, namely because employees retire at 65 years, 
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which means banks have to support the cost of this pension all by themselves until the 
NRA defined for the SS. 
All computations were performed with data sets of small dimension and therefore are 
not a representative sample, larger data sets would have been preferable to take 
conclusions. Additionally, it was not possible to get real data to compute the banking 
pension, hence the conclusions taken do not apply to the banking sector in general. 
In addition, it would have been interesting to also analyze the impact on other 
complementary pension plans, for instance on complementary pension plans offered by the 
insurance sector. 
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Appendix A: Social Security old age pension variables 
𝑵: Total number of years with contributions relevant, maximum of 40.  
𝑹: Total of the 10 best wages in the last 15 years with contributions (or if there is less than 
10, the total wages registered in the last 15 years).  
𝑵𝟏𝟓: Total number of years with contributions in the last 15 years, with the maximum of 
10.  
𝒏: Total number of years with contributions. 
𝑹𝑬: Reference earnings; where: 
𝑅𝐸 =
𝑇𝐸
14 × 𝑁
 
𝑻𝑬: Total earnings (wages) of all the years with contributions, with the maximum of 40 
years – if the beneficiary has more than 40 consider the best 40 wages. Notice that these 
wages should be revalued. The wages referring to periods previous to January 1, 2002 
should be revalued using the IPC excluding housing (available in the Annex I of the 
Ordinance no.266/2014). The wages referring to posterior years should be revalued as the 
ones referred before unless the following formula allows the beneficiary to have a higher 
benefit: 
75% × 𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 25% × average evolution of the contributions to the SS  
(Available in the Annex II of the Ordinance no.266/2014). 
Where this formula is limited to a maximum equal to  𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 0,5%. 
𝑪𝟏: Number of years with contributions of relevant wages until December 31, 2006. 
𝑪𝟐: Number of years with contributions with relevant wages after January 1, 2007. 
𝑪𝟑: Number of years with contributions with relevant wages until December 31, 2001. 
𝑪𝟒: Number of years with contributions with relevant wages after January 1, 2002. 
Remark: Note that the number of years is computed in accordance with the definition 
given in the article no. 12 of the DL no. 187/2007.  
 33 
Appendix B: ALE and NRA projections 
Model 1: 𝑨𝑳?̂?𝒕 = 𝑨𝑳?̂?𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟎, 𝟏𝟕𝟎𝟔𝟔𝟕 
Remark: the annual growth considered was computed as the average annual growth of the ALE from the 
year 2000 until the year 2015. For this computation INE tables were used to obtain the ALE. 
 
Table B. I: Projection of ALE and the retirement age for 2016-2040 (Model 1) 
Year (r) ALE mr m NRA 
2016 19,36 2,24 2 66 years and 2 months 
2017 19,53 2,8 3 66 years and 3 months 
2018 19,7 4,16 4 66 years and 4 months 
2019 19,87 5,52 6 66 years and 6 months 
2020 20,04 6,88 7 66 years and 7 months 
2021 20,21 8,24 8 66 years and 8 months 
2022 20,38 9,6 10 66 years and 10 months 
2023 20,55 10,96 11 66 years and 11 months 
2024 20,72 12,32 12 67 years  
2025 20,89 13,68 14 67 years and 2 months 
2026 21,06 15,04 15 67 years and 3 months 
2027 21,23 16,4 16 67 years and 4 months 
2028 21,4 17,76 18 67 years and 6 months 
2029 21,57 19,12 19 67 years and 7 months 
2030 21,74 20,48 20 67 years and 8 months 
2031 21,91 21,84 22 67 years and 10 months 
2032 22,08 23,2 23 67 years and 11 months 
2033 22,25 24,56 25 68 years and 1 month 
2034 22,42 25,92 26 68 years and 2 months 
2035 22,59 27,28 27 68 years and 3 months 
2036 22,76 28,64 29 68 years and 5 months 
2037 22,93 30 30 68 years and 6 months 
2038 23,1 31,36 31 68 years and 7 months 
2039 23,27 32,72 33 68 years and 9 months 
2040 23,44 34,08 34 68 years and 10 months 
 
  
Assumptions 
   
ALE annual growth  0,170667 
  
 34 
Model 2:  𝑨𝑳?̂?𝒕 = 𝟏, 𝟐𝟓𝟕𝟏 + 𝟎, 𝟗𝟑𝟗𝟔 𝑨𝑳?̂?𝒕−𝟏 
Assumptions       
ALE depends linearly of the ALE in the previous year 
          
     
Remarks: the ALE was estimated using the ordinary least squares method 
 
 
Model 2 - Statistical Input 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,9923 
R Square 0,9847 
Adjusted R Square 0,9835 
Standard Error 0,0946 
Observations 15 
 
ANOVA 
     
 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 7,4647 7,4647 834,5815 0,0000 
Residual 13 0,1163 0,0089 
  
Total 14 7,5810 
   
 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 1,2571 0,5858 2,1460 0,0513 
ALE(t-1) 0,9396 0,0325 28,8891 0,0000 
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Table B. II: Projection of ALE and the retirement age for 2016-2040 (Model 2) 
Year (r) ALE mr m NRA 
2016 19,29 2,24 2 66 years and 2 months 
2017 19,38 2,8 3 66 years and 3 months 
2018 19,47 3,6 4 66 years and 4 months 
2019 19,55 4,32 4 66 years and 4 months 
2020 19,63 5,04 5 66 years and 5 months 
2021 19,7 5,68 6 66 years and 6 months 
2022 19,77 6,32 6 66 years and 6 months 
2023 19,83 6,88 7 66 years and 7 months 
2024 19,89 7,44 7 66 years and 7 months 
2025 19,95 7,92 8 66 years and 8 months 
2026 20 8,4 8 66 years and 8 months 
2027 20,05 8,88 9 66 years and 9 months 
2028 20,1 9,28 9 66 years and 9 months 
2029 20,14 9,68 10 66 years and 10 months 
2030 20,18 10,08 10 66 years and 10 months 
2031 20,22 10,4 10 66 years and 10 months 
2032 20,26 10,72 11 66 years and 11 months 
2033 20,29 11,04 11 66 years and 11 months 
2034 20,32 11,36 11 66 years and 11 months 
2035 20,35 11,6 12 67 years  
2036 20,38 11,84 12 67 years  
2037 20,41 12,08 12 67 years  
2038 20,43 12,32 12 67 years  
2039 20,45 12,56 13 67 years and 1 months 
2040 20,47 12,72 13 67 years and 1 months 
 
 
Model 3: 𝑨𝑳?̂?𝒕 = 𝟎, 𝟏𝟔𝟖𝟕 𝒕 − 𝟑𝟐𝟎, 𝟕𝟐𝟓  
 
  
Assumptions       
ALE depends linearly on time (years) 
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Model 3 - Statistical Input 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,9944 
R Square 0,9889 
Adjusted R Square 0,9881 
Standard Error 0,0883 
Observations 16 
 
 
ANOVA 
     
 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 9,6837 9,6837 1242,8548 0,0000 
Residual 14 0,1091 0,0078 
  
Total 15 9,7928 
   
 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -320,7251 9,6101 -33,3737 0,0000 
t 0,1688 0,0048 35,2541 0,0000 
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Table B. III: Projection of ALE and the retirement age for 2016-2040 (Model 3) 
Year (r) ALE mr m NRA 
2016 19,5 2,24 2 66 years and 2 months 
2017 19,67 2,8 3 66 years and 3 months 
2018 19,84 5,28 5 66 years and 5 months 
2019 20,01 6,64 7 66 years and 7 months 
2020 20,18 8 8 66 years and 8 months 
2021 20,35 9,36 9 66 years and 9 months 
2022 20,52 10,72 11 66 years and 11 months 
2023 20,69 12,08 12 67 years  
2024 20,85 13,44 13 67 years and 1 months 
2025 21,02 14,8 15 67 years and 3 months 
2026 21,19 16,08 16 67 years and 4 months 
2027 21,36 17,44 17 67 years and 5 months 
2028 21,53 18,8 19 67 years and 7 months 
2029 21,7 20,16 20 67 years and 8 months 
2030 21,87 21,52 22 67 years and 10 months 
2031 22,04 22,88 23 67 years and 11 months 
2032 22,2 24,24 24 68 years  
2033 22,37 25,6 26 68 years and 2 months 
2034 22,54 26,88 27 68 years and 3 months 
2035 22,71 28,24 28 68 years and 4 months 
2036 22,88 29,6 30 68 years and 6 months 
2037 23,05 30,96 31 68 years and 7 months 
2038 23,22 32,32 32 68 years and 8 months 
2039 23,39 33,68 34 68 years and 10 months 
2040 23,55 35,04 35 68 years and 11 months 
 38 
 
Chart 3: Comparison between the real ALE and the one estimated by the 3 models 
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Appendix C: Results of the SS Pension  
Assumptions: 
  
No. of salary payments 14 
Wage annual growth rate 2% 
Wage annual growth rate for past salaries 2% 
Revalorization index for future salaries 0,5% 
IAS annual growth rate 0,25% 
Age of retirement NRA 
The employees remain in the company until their retirement  
 
In the table above are the assumptions used to compute the value of the pensions in the 
tool created in VBA. Notice that the tool allows changing any of these assumptions with the 
exception of the last two so any other value would have been possible. 
We use two populations to calculate the SS pensions – the real one and one that was 
intentionally modified. Below are presented the populations data and the respective 
results. Notice that in the results are presented for each population two tables, the first 
table refers to the pensions computed with the new legislation and the second table refers 
to the pensions computed with the previous legislation. 
 
Population: 
Table C. I: Population data 
No. Actual age Age of entry Current Years of service Wage (€) 
1 54 17 38 1.158,85 
2 59 12 48 1.437,85 
3 60 24 36 1.427,85 
4 54 19 36 689,85 
5 60 15 45 646,85 
6 57 15 42 625,85 
7 55 14 41 637,85 
8 55 20 36 723,85 
9 59 24 36 1.308,85 
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All values are presented in Euros 
Table C. II: SS pensions computed with the DL no. 187/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C. III: SS pensions computed with the DL no. 167-E/2013 
 
 
 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
1 26/02/2025 850,49 11.906,88 65,00 26/02/2025 885,98 12.403,75 65,00 26/02/2025 845,19 11.832,64 65,00 
2 02/04/2020 1.018,56 14.259,80 65,00 02/04/2020 1.035,23 14.493,21 65,00 02/04/2020 1.011,43 14.160,03 65,00 
3 03/11/2019 991,74 13.884,38 65,00 03/11/2019 1.003,46 14.048,40 65,00 03/11/2019 984,74 13.786,40 65,00 
4 01/02/2025 506,21 7.086,87 65,00 01/02/2025 527,33 7.382,60 65,00 01/02/2025 503,05 7.042,68 65,00 
5 26/12/2019 456,42 6.389,83 65,00 26/12/2019 461,81 6.465,32 65,00 26/12/2019 453,20 6.344,74 65,00 
6 20/08/2022 451,43 6.319,95 65,00 20/08/2022 463,11 6.483,57 65,00 20/08/2022 448,32 6.276,47 65,00 
7 14/09/2024 467,26 6.541,70 65,00 14/09/2024 484,23 6.779,22 65,00 14/09/2024 464,10 6.497,44 65,00 
8 26/01/2024 526,91 7.376,76 65,00 26/01/2024 546,04 7.644,60 65,00 26/01/2024 523,35 7.326,85 65,00 
9 23/11/2020 917,08 12.839,15 65,00 23/11/2020 932,09 13.049,30 65,00 23/11/2020 910,67 12.749,32 65,00 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
1 26/02/2025 982,28 13.751,98 65,00 26/02/2025 982,28 13.751,98 65,00 26/02/2025 982,28 13.751,98 65,00 
2 02/04/2020 1.128,13 15.793,88 65,00 02/04/2020 1.128,13 15.793,88 65,00 02/04/2020 1.128,13 15.793,88 65,00 
3 03/06/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,58 03/04/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,41 03/07/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,66 
4 01/09/2025 584,65 8.185,06 65,58 01/02/2025 584,65 8.185,06 65,00 01/10/2025 584,65 8.185,06 65,66 
5 26/12/2019 501,19 7.016,71 65,00 26/12/2019 501,19 7.016,71 65,00 26/12/2019 501,19 7.016,71 65,00 
6 20/08/2022 508,55 7.119,64 65,00 20/08/2022 508,55 7.119,64 65,00 20/08/2022 508,55 7.119,64 65,00 
7 14/09/2024 535,24 7.493,42 65,00 14/09/2024 535,24 7.493,42 65,00 14/09/2024 535,24 7.493,42 65,00 
8 26/11/2024 602,83 8.439,60 65,83 26/05/2024 602,83 8.439,60 65,33 26/12/2024 602,83 8.439,60 65,92 
9 23/07/2022 1.047,65 14.667,11 66,66 23/05/2022 1.047,65 14.667,11 66,50 23/08/2022 1.047,65 14.667,11 66,75 
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Modified population:  
Table C. IV: Modified Population data 
No. Actual age Age of entry Current Years of service Wage (€) 
1 54 25 29 1.158,85 
2 59 27 32 1.437,85 
3 60 24 35 1.427,85 
4 54 26 28 689,85 
5 60 25 34 646,85 
6 57 24 32 625,85 
7 55 25 29 637,85 
8 55 26 29 723,85 
9 59 30 29 1.308,85 
 
To construct the population presented in Table C. II only the age of entry of the real 
population was changed, all the other values remained the same. Below it is presented the 
changes done from one table to the other. 
Table C. V: Changes done from the real population to the modified population 
No. 
Age of entry 
(Table C.I) 
Age of entry 
(Table C.IV) 
1 17 25 
2 12 27 
3 24 24 
4 19 26 
5 15 25 
6 15 24 
7 14 25 
8 20 26 
9 24 30 
 
Most of the ages of entry that were altered are above 25 years since it is the youngest age 
from which people no longer benefit from the bonus factor. The ages chosen were chosen 
randomly. 
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All values are presented in Euros 
Table C. VI: SS pensions computed with the DL no. 187/2007 (modified population) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C. VII: SS pensions computed with the DL no. 167-E/2013 (modified population) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
1 26/02/2025 839,72 11.756,11 65,00 26/02/2025 874,76 12.246,69 65,00 26/02/2025 834,49 11.682,81 65,00 
2 02/04/2020 957,76 13.408,58 65,00 02/04/2020 973,43 13.628,06 65,00 02/04/2020 951,05 13.314,77 65,00 
3 03/11/2019 991,74 13.884,38 65,00 03/11/2019 1.003,46 14.048,40 65,00 03/11/2019 984,74 13.786,40 65,00 
4 01/02/2025 489,92 6.858,89 65,00 01/02/2025 510,36 7.145,11 65,00 01/02/2025 486,87 6.816,12 65,00 
5 26/12/2019 449,02 6.286,27 65,00 26/12/2019 454,32 6.360,53 65,00 26/12/2019 445,85 6.241,91 65,00 
6 20/08/2022 447,26 6.261,66 65,00 20/08/2022 458,84 6.423,77 65,00 20/08/2022 444,18 6.218,59 65,00 
7 14/09/2024 456,00 6.384,00 65,00 14/09/2024 472,56 6.615,79 65,00 14/09/2024 452,91 6.340,80 65,00 
8 26/01/2024 499,51 6.993,12 65,00 26/01/2024 517,64 7.247,03 65,00 26/01/2024 496,13 6.945,80 65,00 
9 23/11/2020 807,59 11.306,26 65,00 23/11/2020 820,81 11.491,32 65,00 23/11/2020 801,94 11.227,15 65,00 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly SS 
pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
Retirement 
date 
Monthly 
SS pension 
Annual SS 
pension 
NRA 
1 26/05/2027 1.003,86 14.053,99 67,24 26/10/2026 985,35 13.794,95 66,66 26/06/2027 1.003,86 14.053,99 67,33 
2 02/12/2021 1.101,97 15.427,53 66,67 02/10/2021 1.101,97 15.427,53 66,50 02/01/2022 1.120,79 15.691,06 66,75 
3 03/06/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,58 03/04/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,41 03/07/2021 1.123,87 15.734,18 66,66 
4 01/05/2027 598,38 8.377,37 67,24 01/10/2026 587,98 8.231,72 66,66 01/06/2027 598,38 8.377,37 67,33 
5 26/07/2021 513,60 7.190,47 66,58 26/05/2021 513,60 7.190,47 66,41 26/08/2021 513,60 7.190,47 66,67 
6 20/07/2024 521,15 7.296,10 66,92 20/03/2024 521,15 7.296,10 66,58 20/08/2024 521,15 7.296,10 67,00 
7 14/11/2026 546,00 7.644,01 67,17 14/05/2026 546,63 7.652,81 66,66 14/12/2026 546,00 7.644,01 67,25 
8 26/03/2026 617,79 8.649,03 67,16 26/09/2025 607,16 8.500,31 66,67 26/04/2026 617,79 8.649,03 67,25 
9 23/07/2022 969,21 13.568,92 66,66 23/05/2022 969,21 13.568,92 66,50 23/08/2022 969,21 13.568,92 66,75 
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Appendix D: Impacts of the reforms 
The impact of the NRA 
Table D. I: Impact of NRA (Scenario 1) 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 850,49 856,45 0,7% 885,98 890,04 0,5% 845,19 850,84 0,7% 
2 1.018,56 1.017,04 -0,1% 1.035,23 1.039,14 0,4% 1.011,43 1.018,73 0,7% 
3 991,74 998,19 0,7% 1.003,46 1.019,89 1,6% 984,74 990,86 0,6% 
4 506,21 509,88 0,7% 527,33 530,48 0,6% 503,05 506,53 0,7% 
5 456,42 460,29 0,8% 461,81 470,30 1,8% 453,20 456,91 0,8% 
6 451,43 455,14 0,8% 463,11 472,45 2,0% 448,32 451,87 0,8% 
7 467,26 470,80 0,8% 484,23 494,79 2,2% 464,10 467,69 0,8% 
8 526,91 530,04 0,6% 546,04 548,52 0,5% 523,35 526,54 0,6% 
9 917,08 922,30 0,6% 932,09 946,97 1,6% 910,67 915,57 0,5% 
Caption: ∆ is the percentage of increase/decrease occurred from Before to After. 
Remark: Values in After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual 
discount rate of 0,5%. 
 
Table D. II: Impact of NRA (Scenario 2) 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 850,49 819,44 -3,7% 885,98 861,36 -2,8% 845,19 812,70 -3,8% 
2 1.018,56 984,16 -3,4% 1.035,23 1.008,87 -2,5% 1.011,43 984,16 -2,7% 
3 991,74 967,54 -2,4% 1.003,46 991,83 -1,2% 984,74 958,88 -2,6% 
4 506,21 487,84 -3,6% 527,33 513,39 -2,6% 503,05 483,83 -3,8% 
5 456,42 446,16 -2,2% 461,81 457,36 -1,0% 453,20 442,14 -2,4% 
6 451,43 438,27 -2,9% 463,11 457,94 -1,1% 448,32 434,39 -3,1% 
7 467,26 451,13 -3,5% 484,23 478,85 -1,1% 464,10 447,43 -3,6% 
8 526,91 507,93 -3,6% 546,04 530,79 -2,8% 523,35 503,73 -3,7% 
9 917,08 892,59 -2,7% 932,09 919,48 -1,4% 910,67 884,59 -2,9% 
Remark: Values in After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual 
discount rate of 2,5%. 
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Table D. III: Impact of NRA (Scenario 3) 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 850,49 793,17 -6,7% 885,98 840,82 -5,1% 845,19 785,69 -7,0% 
2 1.018,56 960,61 -5,7% 1.035,23 987,12 -4,6% 1.011,43 959,42 -5,1% 
3 991,74 945,55 -4,7% 1.003,46 971,65 -3,2% 984,74 935,97 -5,0% 
4 506,21 472,20 -6,7% 527,33 501,15 -5,0% 503,05 467,74 -7,0% 
5 456,42 436,02 -4,5% 461,81 448,05 -3,0% 453,20 431,56 -4,8% 
6 451,43 426,24 -5,6% 463,11 447,54 -3,4% 448,32 421,94 -5,9% 
7 467,26 437,16 -6,4% 484,23 467,43 -3,5% 464,10 433,06 -6,7% 
8 526,91 492,22 -6,6% 546,04 518,09 -5,1% 523,35 487,55 -6,8% 
9 917,08 871,30 -5,0% 932,09 899,73 -3,5% 910,67 862,43 -5,3% 
Remark: Values in After are referred to the same time reference than the ones in Before using an annual 
discount rate of 4%. 
 
 
Chart 4: Impact of the NRA (Scenario 1) 
 
Chart 5: Impact of the NRA (Scenario 2) 
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Chart 6: Impact of the NRA (Scenario 3) 
The impact of the SF 
Table D. IV: Impact of the SF 
No. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Before After ∆ Before After ∆ Before After ∆ 
1 850,49 982,28 15,5% 885,98 982,28 10,9% 845,19 982,28 16,2% 
2 1.018,56 1.128,13 10,8% 1.035,23 1.128,13 9,0% 1.011,43 1.128,13 11,5% 
3 991,74 1.089,04 9,8% 1.003,46 1.089,04 8,5% 984,74 1.089,04 10,6% 
4 506,21 584,65 15,5% 527,33 584,65 10,9% 503,05 584,65 16,2% 
5 456,42 501,19 9,8% 461,81 501,19 8,5% 453,20 501,19 10,6% 
6 451,43 508,55 12,7% 463,11 508,55 9,8% 448,32 508,55 13,4% 
7 467,26 535,24 14,5% 484,23 535,24 10,5% 464,10 535,24 15,3% 
8 526,91 603,57 14,5% 546,04 603,57 10,5% 523,35 603,57 15,3% 
9 917,08 1.015,74 10,8% 932,09 1.015,74 9,0% 910,67 1.015,74 11,5% 
 
